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Throughout American history, individual states have engaged in
what scholars have aptly referred to as an ‘orgy of constitutionmaking.’
States’ basic charters, however, have diverged
profoundly from the federal Constitution in virtually every
possible way but one: no state has ever created a parliamentary
system. This Article asks why this is so, and finds that the
answer reveals a basic American political pathology: a hatred of
parties and legislative processes grounded in the electorate’s
mythic belief that the only thing preventing political consensus is
either special interests or venal politicians. The current political
paralysis in Washington, and in state capitals, also derives from
this myth—thus demonstrating that inquiring into the absence of
American parliaments reveals basic flaws in our current political
culture.
Like all election years, 2008 saw its share of figures ripe for
ridicule. Perhaps the strangest might have been Montana’s
Republican candidate for U.S. Senator, Bob Kelleher. Now in his
late 80’s, Kelleher won the nomination mainly due to the disarray
of the state GOP and came with a history of positions usually not
associated with Republicans, such as single-payer health care.1 But
when journalists wanted to communicate just how wacky and
crazy the octogenarian is, they pointed to his belief that the United
States should adopt a parliamentary system.2 Of course, Kelleher
himself seemed not to understand very well the political Everest he
was climbing; acknowledging that shifting to a parliamentary
system would require completely rewriting the U.S. Constitution,
he retorted, “[a]nybody who can type as fast (as a reporter) can

1 See
Bob
Kelleher,
ON
THE
ISSUES,
http://www.ontheissues.org/senate/Bob_Kelleher.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2013).
2
See, e.g., Jennifer McKee, Kelleher: Still Pushing For Parliament, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Sept. 28, 2008, 11:00 PM), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-andregional/montana/kelleher-still-pushing-for-parliament/article_6a5127c7-78765322-84bf-27b3441095d5.html (documenting Montana Senate candidate Bob
Kelleher’s advocacy of American conversion to a parliamentary political system
based on England’s example).
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rewrite the Constitution in an hour.”3 Not surprisingly, powerful
incumbent Senator Max Baucus won in a walkover.4
Kelleher’s position, however, is worth far more than comic
relief, especially in a contemporary U.S. political context that has
descended into paralysis. The polarization of America’s political
parties has turned so extreme that any partisan division of the
political branches threatens an immediate political and economic
crisis. And this dysfunction, in turn, has led many observers to
wonder whether the Presidential system does in fact undermine
American governance. In the wake of the federal government’s
near-default in the summer of 2011, scholars pointed out that now,
only nations with parliamentary systems still have AAA bond
ratings from Standard & Poor’s.5 Time’s Fareed Zakaria noted that
something like the debt-ceiling debacle was impossible in a
parliamentary system because it unifies the executive and
legislature: “If we’re in for another five years of this squabbling in
the U.S., we are going to make presidential systems look pretty bad
indeed.”6 He continued: “It’s all very well to keep saying that we
have the greatest system in the history of the world but against this
background of dysfunction, it sounds a lot like thoughtless
cheerleading.”7 But the United States hardly needed five years to
make Presidentialism look bad: divisions between a Republican
House and a Democratic Senate and President led to another
government shutdown in October 2013, as well as nearly causing a
federal government default. Presidential systems keep looking
worse and worse.

3 Jennifer McKee, Switchover to Parliament not Elementary, BILLINGS GAZETTE
(Aug. 31, 2008, 11:00 PM), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/
montana/switchover-to-parliament-not-elementary/article_85aed7ed-a717-5af69aaf-2c5d0f46e230.html.
4 2008 Election Statistics, OFF. OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2008/2008Stat.htm#stateMT
(last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
5 Joshua Tucker, AAA Ratings and Regime Types, WASH. MONTHLY (Aug. 15,
2011, 6:28 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/2011/
08/aaa_ratings_and_regime_types031529.php.
6 Fareed Zakaria, Does America Need a Prime Minister?, CNN (Aug. 17, 2011,
12:27 PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/17/does-americaneed-a-prime-minister.
7 Fareed Zakaria, Fareed’s Take: Prime Minister . . . of America?, CNN (Aug. 20,
2011, 1:34 PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/20/fareedstake-does-america-need-a-prime-minister.
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To be sure, replacing the federal Constitution with
parliamentarism is close to impossible. Throughout American
history, however, states have uprooted their constitutions several
times; indeed, drastic change defines state constitutional history.
As I will detail below, states have changed their basic charters in
just about every conceivable way but one:
instituting
parliamentary democracy. Given the ease with which states can
and have changed their basic charters, and the radical ideas they
have pursued in doing so, it makes one wonder why the most
powerful alternative to the basic form of U.S. governance has never
been tried.
As I suggest in this Article, the answer to this question is more
interesting and counterintuitive than one might suspect. It is not
about worship of the U.S. Constitution, xenophobia, or ignorance.
Rather, it turns on the traditional American hatred for the idea of
political parties and distrust of legislatures. It thus points to
political pathologies that endure through contemporary times.
1.

GROUND-CLEARING: TIMING AND EVIDENCE

By ‘parliamentary democracy,’ I mean a governmental system
in which the electorate chooses the Legislature, which then in turn
chooses the Executive. The Executive remains formally responsible
to the Legislature and can be dismissed by it at virtually any time,
a process generally known as a ‘vote of no-confidence.’ The
Executive is usually considered to be ‘the Government,’ and its
head is the ‘Prime Minister,’ ‘Premier,’ or some other countryspecific term such as ‘Chancellor’ (Germany), ‘Taoiseach’ (Ireland),
‘Head of the Government’ (Israel), or ‘President of the Chamber of
Deputies’ (Spain).
I do not distinguish between various voting systems for
electing the Legislature as long as the franchise is broad enough to
consider the nation a ‘democracy.’ Great Britain uses individual
districts in which the candidate with the highest number of votes is
elected whether or not she has a majority, a system usually
described as ‘first-past-the-post.’ Israel has no districts at all, and
splits the 120 seats in the Knesset pro rata based upon vote totals as
long as a party receives at least 2% of the national vote, a system
often described as ‘pure list proportional representation.’8
8 For a fuller description of the Israeli electoral system, see The Electoral
System in Israel, KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_
mimshal_beh.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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Germany and Japan operate under complex systems in which
some seats are distributed through national vote totals and some
seats are allocated by regional support, with Japan maintaining
multimember districts. Australian voters must list their ordinal
preferences so that if their most-preferred candidate finishes last,
their vote is allocated to their second choice, a process known as
the Single Transferrable Vote.9 All these systems carry vast
implications for the country’s politics, but all constitute
‘parliamentary democracies.’
1.1. Locating the Problem In Time
A few weeks before adopting the Declaration of Independence,
the Second Continental Congress advised the individual colonies
to start writing their own constitutions,10 and the states have been
responding in orgiastic fashion ever since.
The nineteenth century marked the apex of state constitutional
experimentation. The antebellum period was “an era of permanent
constitutional revision” in the states,11 and “[d]uring the last half of
the nineteenth century, when a concern for continuity dominated
national constitutional theory, state constitution-making was
epidemic.”12 In all, “[o]f those states that joined the Union from
1800 to 1850, only two had not revised their constitutions by
century’s end; altogether, ninety-four state constitutions were

9 For more information on the Australian Single Transferrable Vote System,
see Proportional Representation Voting Systems of Australia’s Parliaments, ELECTRONIC
COUNCIL OF AUSTL. & N.Z., http://www.eca.gov.au/systems/proportional/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013).
10 The precise date was May 10, 1776, upon a resolution moved by John
Adams. See The Resolutions and Recommendations of Congress, U. HOUS. DIGITAL
HIST. PROJECT, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&
psid=3940 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
The Congress then resumed the
consideration of the report from the committee of the whole, which agreed
resolved:

[t]hat it be recommended to the respective assemblies and conventions of
the United Colonies, where no government sufficient to the exigencies of
their affairs have been hitherto established, to adopt such government as
shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to
the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and America
in general.
Id.
11 DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
SINCE INDEPENDENCE 93 (1987).
12 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 94 (1998).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

ZASLOFF_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

274

2/23/2014 2:56 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:1

adopted during the nineteenth century.”13 The process continued
through the Progressive Era, which saw “widespread state
constitution making”14 and revealed “substantial interest in
revising state constitutions and reforming amendment
procedures.”15 The last third of the twentieth century also saw
widespread state constitutional change, but the changes occurred
in forums and were usually limited to deal with specific
substantive issues.16
So as between the Revolution and the First World War, where
should we focus? For the purposes of this project, the Gilded
Age/Progressive Era nexus forms the most appropriate time, for
two primary reasons. First, while many states revised their
constitutions during Reconstruction, for the most part this came in
the wake of the Civil War and the attempts to re-enter the Union; it
would not represent a way of thinking about government
structure, but rather about slavery and race. Second, before the
Civil War era, quite literally there were no parliamentary
democracies for Americans to emulate or learn from. Great Britain
only became a mass democracy with the Reform Bill of 1867;17
while its 1832 predecessor carries the august name of the ‘Great
Reform,’ that Act was concerned more about eliminating corrupt
parliamentary districts than about extending the franchise.18 On
the eve of the 1867 Act, less than twenty percent of British adult
males could vote, and the system of the 1832 Act remained in
control of the aristocracy.19 Similarly, France did not become a
democratic republic until 1870–71; Italy was still consolidating
itself around the same time; Germany remained firmly under the
Id.
JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 10 (2006).
15 Id. at 47–48.
16 Id. at 10.
17 See H.J. HANHAM, ELECTIONS AND PARTY MANAGEMENT: POLITICS IN THE TIME
OF DISRAELI AND GLADSTONE, at xxiii (The Shoe String Press, Inc., 2d ed. 1978)
(1959).
18 See, e.g., LLEWELLYN WOODWARD, THE AGE OF REFORM, 1815–1870, at 78–81
(1962) (noting that the government was more interested in reforming Parliament
than establishing democracy).
19 See HANHAM, supra note 17, at xxvi–xxvii (“The Reform Act of 1832 had
called the new forces in English life into the parliamentary forum, but it had not
decided what role they were to play. Indeed, after satisfying the most pressing
demands of their supporters, the reformers had deliberately preserved for the old
aristocracy much more power and influence than its experience of government
and prestige alone would have won it.”)
13
14
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control of a monarchy, albeit with a sort of limited Reichstag; and
Canada did not establish its own parliament—with vague
independent powers—until 1867. Although (as will be noted
below) state constitution-makers were hardly shy in
recommending radical changes, it would be asking too much to
expect them to develop a new form of democracy on their own.
By the 1870’s and 1880’s, however, Americans could see robust
parliamentary democracies all across Western Europe as well as
through Canada and its provincial governments. Britain’s Ballot
Act of 1872 instituted the secret ballot (far in advance of the United
States);20 both major parties attracted more than a million votes for
the first time with the general election of 1874.21 It makes sense,
then, to start at the time when parliamentarism could serve as a
realistic option for American state constitution-makers.
1.2. Silence in the Chamber
A reasonable reader might now expect a review of what state
constitution-makers said about the problem. This is indeed what
the reasonable law professor expected to write when he began
researching the topic. Therein lies the problem. Even the most
punctilious reader will search in vain for discussions in
conventions of whether parliamentary forms should be adopted.
The most comprehensive study of state conventions has found just
one during the period to be considered here: a brief colloquy in the
Massachusetts Convention of 1919. Aside from that, there is
nothing. Not until the 1970’s did the issue raise its head again: 1)
Illinois in 1976, when the proposal was dispatched with thirty
seconds of debate; and 2) Montana in 1972, when the idea was
advocated by—unsurprisingly—the indefatigable Kelleher, who
gave an impassioned floor speech, was voted down, and left to
nurse his wounds for another quarter century.
2.

EXPLORING HYPOTHESES

In the absence of direct evidence, we might consider the
indirect approach, namely, investigating the most plausible
hypotheses and determining which one(s) seem to be the most
20 See Pontefract’s Secret Ballot Box, 1872, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
ahistoryoftheworld/objects/WryVwsknTr-aa4IQ-ID9iQ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013)
(showing the first ballot box used in Great Britain, in 1872, and giving background
on the Ballot Act).
21 HANHAM, supra note 17, at xi.
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plausible. I consider 1) unconstitutionality, i.e., that instituting statelevel parliamentary systems would violate the United States
Constitution; 2) tradition, i.e., that Americans were simply unable
to recommend such a radical change from either the U.S.
Constitution or their previous state charters; 3) ignorance, i.e., that
Americans knew little or nothing about parliamentary government
and thus could not be expected to imitate it; 4) conservatism, i.e.,
that Americans realized that parliamentary systems created a more
activist government and rejected it for that reason; and 5)
xenophobia, i.e., that Americans self-consciously rejected any
European political system because of their distaste for European
things in general and European politics in particular. I find that
none of these hypotheses can adequately explain American
rejection of parliamentary system.
2.1. Constitutional Disability
The most obvious potential reason—that state parliamentary
systems would violate the U.S. Constitution—is also the most
easily dispatched.
Quite literally, there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that
even suggests the illegitimacy of parliamentarism. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that federal separation of powers
doctrine does not apply to the states.22 Even Michael Dorf, who
claims that the “federal Constitution implicitly assumes that state
governments will be structured along lines broadly similar to the
federal government,”23 can do little better than to argue that the
federal Constitution requires an entity called a state “legislature”
and another that can be called a state “executive.”24 If that is all the
federal Constitution requires, then we need not detain ourselves.
A state-level parliamentary system could co-exist quite easily
within the United States: if the federal Constitution required action
by the “Legislature,” then Parliament as a whole would be the
relevant actor, and if it called for action by the “Executive,” then it
22 See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equal League, 415 U.S. 605, 615
(1974); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187
U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
23 Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers,
4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54–55 (1999).
24 Id.
Dorf also insists that the federal Constitution requires ‘distinct’
legislative and executive bodies, but he does not claim that this ‘distinction’
would be violated by the Legislature choosing the Executive out of its own
members.
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would be the state-level Cabinet—although there might be
litigation to determine whether it would be the state’s Prime
Minister or the Cabinet as a whole. Answering this Article’s
question requires us to look elsewhere.
2.2. Tradition
In different guises, what we might call the Anatevka Principle
would seem to be the favorite explanation. Either Americans’
devotion to the U.S. Constitution, or general reluctance to tamper
with its forms, would suffice to explain the dearth of parliamentary
democracy.
Such an account quickly flounders on the facts. The love for
the U.S. Constitution hardly prevented state constitution-makers
from departing from it, often in very fundamental ways. States
tasked legislatures with appointing executive officers, or gave the
job to Councils of Revision.25 Rejecting the federal Constitution’s
provision that “the executive [p]ower shall be vested in a President
of the United States . . . ,”26 most states opted for explicitly plural
executives–a condition that still spawns litigation today.27 A few
states even denied the veto power entirely to the Governor; others
granted the Governor a line-item veto, which violates the federal
separation-of-powers doctrine.28 The American Revolutionaries
detested what they saw as Parliament’s “corruption” at the hands
of the executive and forbade legislators from accepting executive
appointments, but several states yawned at such a prospect and
self-consciously allowed such co-mingling.29
Several states
vigorously debated unicameralism, a few conventions put
unicameral proposals on the ballot, and one–Nebraska—adopted
it.30
Even those that did not often radically changed the
25 See Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1770
(1996) (noting that early state constitutions gave legislatures tasks currently
thought to be executive and vice-versa).
26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
27 See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 150 (1981)
(enjoining state attorney general from litigation against state agencies when he
has previously represented them).
28 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998)
(“[P]rocedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the
Constitution”).
29 See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1770.
30 For debates surrounding bicameralism, see JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 137—83 (2006). Nebraska’s provision may be
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composition of their state senates to diverge from the U.S.
Constitution’s territorial principle. Most spectacularly (at least
from a lawyer’s perspective), a supermajority of American states
instituted the popular election of the judiciary.31 If this was fealty
to the Constitution, it only failed to look like betrayal because the
1860’s saw an actual one.
2.3. Ignorance or Misunderstanding
Perhaps the answer can be found in American parochialism:
maybe Americans merely had little interest in events on the other
side of the pond. But this assumption can certainly be overstated;
indeed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “much
of the discussion of American constitutionalism took place in the
dual context of Anglo-American comparisons;”32 indeed, “[f]or a
full generation following 1885, fascination with Anglo-American
constitutional comparisons ran high.”33
Nor did these comparisons simply boil down to encomia
concerning American superiority.
In 1861, Walter Bagehot
famously criticized the American Constitution in general and the
separation of powers in particular, a critique “that caused real
reverberations in America.”34 A quarter century later, a young
political scientist named Woodrow Wilson “quickly became a
nationally prominent voice for political reform”35 by heretically
denouncing the separation of powers as a “radical defect” in the

found at NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1875) (“The legislative authority of the state shall
be vested in a Legislature consisting of one chamber.”).
31 See Caleb Neloson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993) (“While
every state that entered the Union before 1845 did so with an appointed judiciary,
every state that entered between 1846 and 1912 provided for judicial elections. In
the more established states, furthermore, all but two of the sixteen constitutional
conventions held between 1846 and 1860 called for the popular election of both
inferior and appellate judges. As the nation approached the Civil War, two of
every three states elected their lower court judges, and three of every five states
elected their Supreme Court.”)
32 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 181 (1986).
33 Id. at 166.
34 Id. at 159.
35 DANIEL D. STID, THE PRESIDENT AS STATESMAN: WOODROW WILSON AND THE
CONSTITUTION 6 (1998).
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U.S. Constitution.36 Not everyone agreed with Wilson, of course,
but that was the whole point: his work spurred an important
debate within American educated opinion.
One who closely followed Wilson’s analysis was the Scottish
scholar and legislator James Bryce, whose American Commonwealth
appeared in 1888: “For more than three decades his assessment of
the U.S. Constitution would be cited as authoritative.”37 Bryce
never called for Americans to adopt a parliamentary system, and
went out of his way to honor the U.S. Constitution as a document
appropriate for American conditions.38 But in The American
Commonwealth Bryce presented an extensive comparison of the
differences between presidential and parliamentary democracy.39
After reading Bryce’s book, no one could fail to remain ignorant of
the nature of parliamentarism.
Indeed, many people did read Bryce’s book. When The
American Commonwealth appeared, “[l]engthy reviews in journals of
opinion appeared every month throughout” that year.40 It was no
surprise that so many Americans were interested in Bryce’s book,
for he had probably consulted them when he was preparing it:
The Scotsman relied for information and answers on conversations
and “an incredibly extensive correspondence with a wide range of
elite Americans in a dozen cities.”41 The work was popular enough
that Bryce produced a second edition only six years later–not a
typical occurrence for a more than 1,000 page tome.
Bryce’s network of contacts and his book’s popularity gave him
minor celebrity status, which His Majesty’s Government made sure
to exploit. When Britain’s government in 1907 wanted to send an
Ambassador to the United States in order to maintain the AngloAmerican entente, it sent Bryce to fill the role.42 In 1915, when it
wanted to bolster U.S. friendship after the outbreak of World War
36 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 284 (1885).
37 KAMMEN, supra note 32, at 165.
38 See,
e.g., JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 356–62
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund ed. 1995) (1910).
39 Id. at 193–203.
40 KAMMEN, supra note 32, at 165.
41 David C. Hammack, Elite Perceptions of Power in the Cities of the United
States, 1880-1900: The Evidence of James Bryce, Moisei Ostrogorski, and Their American
Informants, 4 J. URB. HIST. 363, 365 (1978).
42 EDMUND IONS, JAMES BRYCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1870-1922, at 203-41
(1968).
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I, it appointed Bryce to head the commission to investigate
“German atrocities” in Belgium.43 Three years earlier, when
several thousand members of the Pennsylvania Society attended a
dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria to honor the 125th anniversary of the
Constitution, the Society corralled Bryce, not an American, to give
the principal address.44 The point is not that Bryce was a popular
figure, but rather that educated Americans knew his book, and
could not have been ignorant about parliamentarism.
Did Americans think that Britain was still an actual functioning
monarchy because of the Crown’s formal role in the system?
Probably not: Americans, at least educated ones, knew quite well
that two mass political parties competed for favor among British
voters, and that the electorate rendered the decision. In 1867,
Walter Bagehot had famously described the monarchy as a
“theatrical show of society,” which is “commonly hidden like a
mystery, and sometimes paraded as a pageant.”45 His insight
quickly became commonplace. By the Gilded Age, even a cursory
observer would have understood the basically democratic
character of British political institutions. Wilson and Bryce made
that very clear in their works, and contemporary newspaper
reports did the same.46
2.4. Xenophobia
Maybe hatred rather than ignorance explains the problem. If
Britain did something, then that was often good enough reason for
America to avoid it. Certainly the tradition of hatred of England
had purchase in American politics. Holding “the vision of Britain
as an oppressive empire, bent on the conquest of the earth . . . [b]y
the late 1880s, John Bull-baiting had become a common stock-in-

43 The results of this investigation are usually referred to as the “Bryce
Report,” and, unsurprisingly, concluded that German troops were guilty of
repeated “outrages.” JAMES BRYCE, THE BRYCE REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON ALLEGED GERMAN OUTRAGES (1915), available at http://www.firstworldwar.
com/source/brycereport.htm.
44 KAMMEN, supra note 32, at 165.
45 WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 51, 70 (1867).
46 See, e.g., Liberals Still Gaining: Mr. Gladstone’s Party Almost Sure of Success,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1880, at A1. Of particular interest for current purposes is that
the Times’ report of the Liberal victory was reported on the same page and in the
same columns as election contests in the American states. See, e.g., The Burdens of
Office: Heavy Responsibilities of the Gladstone Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1880,
at 2 (noting fierce interparty competition and pressure from constituents).
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trade for Republican politicians” eager to maintain high tariffs.47
But not for them alone. Democrats reliant on Irish-American votes
were always anxious to “twist the lion’s tail,” especially because
their program of lowering tariffs seemed to comport with English
free-trade ideology.48 Democrat Grover Cleveland’s overheated
1896 response to British actions in Venezuela was designed to
avoid accusations of Anglophilia.49
But political antipathy hardly implied hatred for British
institutions and statesmen. British Prime Minister William E.
Gladstone, notes Ernest May, was “idolized” by Americans.50 This
was particularly true of the reformers who strongly backed
constitutional revision:
for the reformer, observes Ari
Hoogenboom, “John Stuart Mill was his philosopher and William
E. Gladstone his ideal statesman.”51 While a schoolboy, Wilson
had kept a portrait of the Grand Old Man above his desk and
proclaimed him “the greatest statesman that ever lived.”52
In any event, American suspicions of British policy never
became anything close to general xenophobia. Importantly,
Americans generally maintained positive feelings for France,
especially after the emergence in 1871 of the Third Republic (which
adopted a parliamentary system).53 Americans wished that French
politics might resemble American politics more closely and (in the
wake of the Dreyfus affair) be less anti-Semitic.54 But even FrancoAmerican rivalry over the proposed Isthmian canal never yielded
any sort of anti-French movement, in no small part because
Americans appreciated the sturdiness of French Republicanism.55
Only a few years after the Paris Commune, Americans had come to
see France as a true republic. By 1902, Secretary of War Elihu Root
47 MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES: GETTING, KEEPING, AND USING
POWER IN GILDED AGE POLITICS 60-61 (2004).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 62.
50 ERNEST R. MAY, AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: A SPECULATIVE ESSAY 143 (1968).
51 ARI A. HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT 1865-1883, at 21 (1961).
52 RAY STANNARD BAKER, 1 WOODROW WILSON: LIFE AND LETTERS 57 (1927).
53 The best general survey of U.S. attitudes towards France in this period, and
indeed from the Revolution through the 1920’s, is found in ELIZABETH BRETT
WHITE, AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE: FROM LAFAYETTE TO POINCARE (1927). For
summary of the pre-World War I Third Republic period, see id. at 208-34.
54 Id. at 251-256
55 Id. at 218-233.
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noted that during the previous three decades France had “prov[ed]
itself a most important, most significant stronghold of popular
rights, of popular sovereignty and of hopes for the futures of the
peoples of the earth.”56
In short, then, there is little evidence of self-conscious, antiEuropean American exceptionalism in the specific design of
political institutions. Regarding Europe, Americans had gripes,
complaints, and conceits and biases—but they did not have
hatreds. They were not inclined to reject ideas simply because they
were European.
2.5. Conservatism
Perhaps the very reason why some prefer parliamentary
government—its tendency toward activism—is why Americans
rejected it. In this sense, it is not so much that the separation of
powers caused weaker government, but rather the American desire
for it, instantiated through the separation of powers.
This hypothesis also runs aground on the brute facts of
American history. Although the Gilded Age is often thought of as
the age of laissez-faire, it was anything but, and certainly by the
Progressive Era such tendencies had been extinguished. Consider
the wide and deep range of vigorous state action during the
period: state and municipal-owned utilities (“gas and water
socialism”), food and drug laws, railroad regulations, workers’
compensation, state-level labor laws, forest conservation, antitrust
laws, progressive taxation, and campaign finance laws. Moreover,
recall the agencies just at the federal level that emerged during the
period: the United States Geological Survey (1879),57 the Interstate
Commerce Commission (1887), the Agriculture Department (1889),
the Commerce and Labor Department (1903), the FDA (1906), the
Bureau of Reclamation (1902), the Forest Service (1905), Federal
Reserve (1913), and the FTC (1913).
Reformers wanted stronger government. For the most part,
however, they insisted that it be done through the executive
branch and ‘apolitical’ administrative agencies. If anything, this
explanation shows how much reformers went out of their way to
avoid parliaments.
Id. at 230.
See also WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN
WESLEY POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST (1952) (describing the
1870’s and 1880’s as the era of “big government science”).
56
57

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/5

ZASLOFF_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/23/2014 2:56 PM

WHY NO PARLIAMENTS IN THE U.S.?
3.

283

WHY HAVE PARLIAMENTS IN THE FIRST PLACE?

If the preceding discussion appears to have boxed us into a
corner, we might escape by reframing the inquiry. On what
grounds would potential constitution-makers choose a
parliamentary over a presidential system? Many of the most
prominent state constitutional revisions had obvious (if not always
persuasive) justifications: the initiative to go around the corrupt
legislature, or an elected judiciary for greater democratization. So
why have a parliamentary system? One reason, alluded to above,
would be government efficacy and efficiency: because presidential
systems multiply veto points, they make governmental action
ponderous and difficult. And one might argue that this was the
reason why the Framers adopted it at the 1787 Convention.58 But
whatever the merits of that argument, it cannot explain political
behavior during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.
The key attribute of a parliamentary system, however, begins
to clarify the matter. All parliamentary systems rely upon party
cohesion to organize the government.59 Parliamentary systems
cannot exist without parties and thus empower them.60 It stands to
reason, then, that constitution-makers supportive of parties’ role in
government would have favored parliamentary systems.
To the extent that parliamentarism represents a party-based
order, then the late nineteenth century would have been the ideal
time for it to take its place in the constellation of American political
58 At least that is the standard argument, and it is credible and plausible,
although hardly undeniable. See, e.g., Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“The choices we discern as having been made in the
Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often
seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were
consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that
permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the
Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the
cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit
Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the
President. With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse,
we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the
exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution.”) (citations omitted).
59 See, e.g., Kevin Drum, Can America Survive Parliamentary Norms in a
Presidential System?, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 14, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://www.
motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/10/can-america-survive-parliamentarynorms-presidential-system (outlining in general terms how a parliamentary
system works).
60 Id.
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ideas. Post-Reconstruction America, observes Stephen Skowronek,
signaled the triumph of “[t]he state of courts and parties.”61 After
the Democratic resurgence in 1874, the Gilded Age saw fierce interparty competition, as Democrats and Republicans divided
governmental control for all but six years from 1874 to 1896.
Presidential majorities were also razor-thin, and in two
Presidential elections, the electoral college and the popular vote
split.62 Thus, notes Skowronek,
[t]he nature of electoral competition in these years further
extended the hegemony of party concerns over
governmental operations. More than ever before, the
calculations of those in power were wedded to the
imperatives of maintaining efficiency in state and local
political machines and of forging a national coalition from
these machines for presidential elections.63
The dominance of parties was not simply an established
political fact: it was legitimized by prevailing political ideology.
From the mid-1830’s, to the turn of the century,
partisan ideas, commitments, and organization not only
spread throughout the Union but, more critically,
penetrated the system deeply and completely enough to
become the mainstay of the political nation. The ideological
case for party became more dominant; it took on a different
tone as well, less defensive, more assured and assertive,
more celebratory.
Spokesmen made a sustained,
unambiguous case that rarely wavered . . . But there was
much more going on than the expression of rhetoric.
Building on the arguments made, powerful partisan

61 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 39 (1982).
62 In 1876, Democrat Samuel J. Tilden captured the popular vote, but
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes triumphed in the electoral college under
circumstances still debated to this day. For a classic account of this election, see C.
VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END
OF RECONSTRUCTION (1951) (providing insight into the 1876 Tilden election).
Twelve years later, Republican Benjamin Harrison unseated incumbent
Democratic President Grover Cleveland, even though Cleveland won the popular
vote. In 1892, Cleveland then defeated Harrison, becoming the only President in
American history to serve non-consecutive terms.
63 SKOWRONEK, supra note 61, at 39 (footnote omitted).
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perspectives grew and, most critically, were adopted as the
nation’s norm with important behavioral consequences.64
Until the end of the 1850’s, notes Ronald Formisano, party
organizations “established an unassailable command of the routine
political life.”65
What could be better, then, than a state-level parliamentary
system, where patronage and spending were run through party
organizations? A parliamentary system would have allowed party
organizations to keep a watchful eye on the Governor/Premier,
enabling them to unseat him if he went off the reservation. The
mystery, then, deepens: it would seem that the late nineteenth
century would be just the time when party dominance would have
led for a push for parliamentarism. Why didn’t the dog bark?
4.

VILLAINS OF THE GILDED AGE: LEGISLATURES AND PARTIES

To answer this question, we must consider those states that
rewrote their constitutions during the Gilded Age and the
Progressive Era. More specifically, we should look at those people
and groups who pushed for constitutional revision.
This
examination is less easy that one might first think: although
scholars have closely examined the nature of power in the late
nineteenth century, they have rarely focused on the politics or
intellectual theories behind state constitutional revisions. At this
stage, however, we can provide one generalization. For the most
part, reformers focused on two major and interrelated issues: the
corruption of the legislature and the destructive influence of
parties.
California’s 1878–79 Convention serves as a typical example.
The movement for constitutional reform was led by what would
eventually become the right wing of the Progressive movement,
comprising small businessmen and educated (mostly Protestant)
middle classes. The reformers yearned principally “to recapture an
older golden age of republican politics”66—one predating the
partisan warfare that had begun in the mid-1830s:
“[t]he
nostalgic—or alternatively, optimistic—evocation of a purer
JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL NATION, 1838-1893, at 33-34 (1991).
RONALD P. FORMISANO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE:
MASSACHUSETTS PARTIES, 1790S-1840S, at 23 (1983).
66 Harry N. Scheiber, Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical Perspective on the
1879 California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35, 39 (1989–90).
64
65
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political order was often expressed in a harsh critical stance against
the regular parties.”67 The editors of the Daily Alta California
expressed the reformers’ tone, one with particular resonance for
the question at hand:
There is to be neither Republicanism nor Democracy, as
party tenets, embodied in the instrument to be framed [by
the convention], but Americanism, if we may so speak, in
contradiction to French Communism, German Red
Republicanism, or the still wilder agrarian notions which
have recently been so loudly proclaimed even in this
country among the less intelligent classes.68
Thus, state constitutional reform advocates specifically strove
to avoid European political forms, not out of xenophobia but rather
because they bred strong parties, which at least in some
circumstances bred radicalism. In this ideological context, had
anyone suggested moving to a parliamentary system, they would
have been Red-baited into political irrelevance.
The party machines got the message, essentially running slates
of stealth candidates under fusion and “nonpartisan” tickets; party
regulars distanced themselves from the machine in order to get
elected—which they did, forming a majority of convention
delegates.69
New York’s 1895 Convention appealed to similar
constituencies, although its origins diverged from California’s. The
state’s 1846 Constitution provided for an automatic referendum
every twenty years to determine whether to hold a new
constitutional convention.70 Led by antiparty advocates, in 1886
the state’s voters “overwhelmingly approved” a new convention.71
But since Republicans and Democrats blocked each other for seven
years over delegate selection procedures, the plan remained
dormant until the Democrats emerged victorious in the 1891

Id. at 40.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting What Is Needed Is a General Representation
of All the Honest Classes, DAILY ALTA CAL., Apr. 18, 1878, at 1).
69 RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, FROM REALIGNMENT TO REFORM: POLITICAL CHANGE
IN NEW YORK STATE, 1893–1910, at 52–56 (1981).
70 Id. at 52.
71 Id.
67
68
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elections and established procedures that they thought would be
favorable to them.72
To counter, the Republican machine nominated men
“distinguished for their professional activities rather than for close
association with the party organization,”73 although the GOP’s two
most important delegates, lawyers Elihu Root and Joseph H.
Choate, were in fact staunch Republicans dedicated to ensuring
their party’s hegemony.74 Much to many people’s surprise, the
Republicans triumphed in the 1893 election, and their convention
delegates went to work, crafting provisions that appealed to
independents concerned about corruption but actually tended to
enhance Republican prospects.75
And what would this new ‘American’ convention actually do
to the state constitution? One institutional reform dominated:
reduce the power of the Legislature. Although delegates to many
state conventions were wary of making their states’ charters too
long, “such concerns underwent a change with . . . a growing
suspicion, if not outright distrust, of legislatures.”76 Specifically,
“from California’s first convention in 1849 to the Western States’
conventions of the late 1880s, delegates recognized that one of the
principal purposes of the constitutions they were drafting was the
expression of limitations—substantive as well as procedural—on
the powers of state legislatures.”77 Similarly, “[t]he ultimate thrust
of constitutional revision after the Civil War was . . . ‘a grand
design to reduce the field of state law and withhold from it every
subject which it is not necessary to concede.’ New and revised
constitutions in the 1870s substantially reduced legislative
Id.
Id.
74 Id.
75 For example, many provisions ostensibly ensuring the integrity of the voter
rolls made it very difficult to register urban immigrant voters, the backbone of the
Democratic Party. The Convention separated municipal elections from state ones,
which made it easier for urban Republicans to divorce themselves from the state
party attracting Democratic votes. This supposed ‘nonpartisan’ reform garnered
independent support for the GOP. But another independent priority—stronger
municipal home rule provisions—died in committee: Republicans had little
interest in giving predominantly Democratic cities more autonomy. See id. at 53–
55.
76 Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited:
Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century
West, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 945, 967 (1994) (footnote omitted).
77 Id. at 970.
72
73
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authority.”78 The pattern continued through the Gilded Age, with
some state conventions in the 1880s and 1890s enshrining
regulatory commissions because they were thought to be more
reflective of the popular will than legislatures.79 State conventions
insisted on single-subject rules, which were vague enough to give
judges wide latitude to strike down statutes. By 1914, one
academic commentator became so exasperated with repeated
attempts to hamstring state lawmakers that he complained of a
legislature so ‘hampered’ that it could not legislate.80
Azariah Flagg was a New York barnburner whose fierce antirailroad campaign in Illinois was typical of the radicals who
created mid-century Midwestern constitutional politics. An 1873
speech celebrating the radicals’ victory in getting a new Illinois
Constitution approved three years earlier encapsulates succinctly
how political issues relate to constitutional change:
But if discussion does not convince, power must compel.
This nation was not formed to be run by moneyed
corporations. My liberties and yours are not to be bartered and
sold away by venal legislators; and the government of this
state and nation must be in the interests of liberty and the
people. Our election of judges signified this, and the work
when kept up must go on until legislatures, judges, and
executive officers understand that there has been too much
time and expense devoted to chartered capital and too little
to promote the welfare of the people . . . And let no man be
horrified when we propose to elect judges that stand by
popular rights.81
To be sure, there is a passing reference to “executive officers,”
but it is obvious that the focus here is on legislatures and judges.
This hatred for legislatures should hardly come as a surprise: the
78 MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 112 (1977).
79 See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 240-46 (1950).
80 Orrin K. MacMurray, Some Tendencies in Constitution Making, 2 CAL. L. REV.
201, 213 (1914). See also id. (describing the current era as one of “[d]irect
limitations upon legislative power”).
81 See Alan Jones, Republicanism, Railroads, and Nineteenth Century Midwestern
Constitutionalism, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 239, 255-67 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard
Dickman eds., 1989) (quoting a speech by Flagg addressing a convention of
farmers in 1873) (emphasis added).
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late nineteenth century served as the heyday of works such as
Thomas M. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, published in 1868
and reprinted several times over the next thirty years, which
attempted to rein in the power of government.
But a closer look at the book’s title is instructive. The title is,
officially, A Treatise Upon the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest
Upon The Legislative Power of the States of the American Union.82 It
might seem odd to lump together a jurist like Cooley and a radical
like Flagg, but this conflation only underscores the point:
constitutional reformers could disagree vehemently with each
other on particulars, but they all agreed on their desire to reduce
the power of the legislature and curtail the influence of parties.
As the Gilded Age gave way to the Progressive Era, reformers
poured old wine in new bottles, which should come as little
surprise since many of them were the same people or came from
similar political pedigrees.83 Reformers had political parties
squarely in their crosshairs. For the Massachusetts Convention of
1917-1919, the delegate selection rules ensured that party influence
would be diminished as much as possible: delegates were elected
without identifying party labels, a major Progressive demand, and
were placed on the ballot by petition instead of through a formal
nomination process.84 Ohio’s new Constitution of 1912 banned
party-nominating conventions, mandating that any future
constitutional conventions or constitutional amendments be nonpartisan.85
Once again, the Legislature came in for the brunt of the attacks.
Now, however, reformers’ main weapon was the ‘initiative and
referendum,’ perhaps the quintessential attack on the legislative
process, as this method undermines the essential idea of
representative democracy. So omnipresent was this proposal that in

82 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
(1st ed. 1868).
83 See, e.g., Michael E. McGerr, The Decline of Popular Politics: The American
North, 1865-1928, at 151-53 (1986) (noting that early anti-partisan reformers
became dominant among middle-class reform during the first decade of the
twentieth century).
84 See John Allen Hague, The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: 19171919. A Study of Dogmatism in an Age of Transition, 27 NEW ENG. Q. 147, 150 (1954)
(describing the election procedures for the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention of 1917).
85 Ohio’s New Constitution, 24 GREEN BAG 506, 508 (1912).
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Massachusetts the delegates spent fully one-third of its time
debating it.86 And “in the sixteen years between 1902 and 1918,
over two-fifths of the states then in the union adopted the
initiative.”87
We can see these political themes most clearly in the case of
E.L. Godkin, founder of The Nation, editor of the New York Evening
Post, and a man with “extraordinary influence on the opinions of
the educated professional, and reforming classes.”88 William James
is widely cited as stating, “To my generation . . . Godkin’s was
certainly the towering influence in all thought concerning public
affairs, and indirectly his influence has certainly been more
pervasive than that of any other writer of the generation.”89
Godkin was appalled at Flagg’s address quoted above, calling it
“worthy of a Paris Communard,”90 but he shared with the radical a
distrust for legislatures and an attempt at curing democracy with
more democracy. In particular, Godkin was enthused about state
constitutional revision as a cure for what he saw as the legislative
mess:
[I] do not look for the improvement of democratic
legislatures in quality within any moderate period. What I
believe democratic societies will do, in order to improve
their government and make better provision for the
protection of property and the preservation of order, is to
restrict the power of these assemblies and shorten their
sittings, and to use the referendum more freely for the
production of really important laws. I have very little
doubt that, before many years elapse, the American people
will get their government more largely from constitutional
conventions, and will confine the legislatures within very
narrow limits and make them meet at rare intervals.91

See Hague, supra note 84, at 150.
RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
AMERICA 39 (2002).
86
87

IN

88 See ROBERT KELLEY, THE TRANSATLANTIC PERSUASION: THE LIBERALDEMOCRATIC MIND IN THE AGE OF GLADSTONE 299 (1969).
89 See id.
90 See Jones, supra note 81, at 257.
91 EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN, PROBLEMS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC ESSAYS 297-98 (1896).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/5

ZASLOFF_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/23/2014 2:56 PM

WHY NO PARLIAMENTS IN THE U.S.?

291

“[T]he duty of the government,” he predicted, “will be
confined to simply weighing and stamping.”92
A prophet he was not. But he did not strike out, either.
Indeed, one could argue that he accurately predicted much of the
future course of California constitutionalism: the adoption of
initiative and referendum, the use of these instruments to create
the state’s fiscal constitution, and the voters’ reliance on them to
protect their property.
5. THE SILENCE OF THE BACKLASH
If reformers hated parties and wanted to use the constitutional
revision process to undercut them, one might well wonder why the
leaders of party machines did not attempt an equal and opposite
reaction, namely, using the constitutional revision process to
strengthen parties and instituting parliamentary government. As
with everything else, we have no direct evidence, but a relatively
straightforward answer appears. Machine leaders had little to gain
and much to fear from radically reforming a system that they
already dominated. They knew how to nominate and elect
candidates, how to pull the levers of patronage, how to stuff ballot
boxes, how to drive their workers to the polls, and how to stop
their opponents from voting. There is a reason, after all, why party
organizations were called machines. Under these circumstances,
any party leader confronted with radical reform would simply
laugh at the prospect. In any event, machine leaders were not
theoretically minded, to say the least.
6.

ANSWERING THE QUESTION

In light of the forces pushing for constitutional revision,
answering the question posed by the Article becomes relatively
straightforward once we consider for a moment the fundamental
nature of parliamentary systems. In such systems, formally the
legislature dominates the executive (usually referred to as the
cabinet, or the government). It can dismiss the executive if it
wants, and if the executive’s initiatives fail, the government
usually resigns or calls a new election to establish ‘confidence.’
Informally, the legislature agrees on a government only through
negotiations between parties. Parties are crucial to parliamentary
systems; without them, negotiations to establish a government
92

Id. at 298.
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would rapidly come to resemble Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.
Even in those countries such as Great Britain and Canada, where
coalitions are usually unnecessary, general elections are
competitions between parties: the question turns on which party
will gain enough seats in order to form a majority in the legislature
and thus form the government. Thus, state constitution makers
never seriously entertained the possibility of establishing
parliamentary government at the state level because doing so
would have empowered precisely those two political institutions
that they most distrusted and detested: political parties and the
legislative branch.
The hatred of legislatures carried with it a potentially
important irony, for one could argue that the rejection of
parliamentarism empowers the legislative branch. James Q.
Wilson makes the argument most succinctly. Congress, he
observes,
is extraordinarily powerful when compared to the
parliaments of many European democracies. Though a
parliament can select the prime minister, often it can do
little more: the British House of Commons, for example,
cannot without the permission of the prime minister amend
a bill, alter a budget, conduct a hearing, or render a service.
More exactly, it can do some of these things over the
objection of the prime minister, but in doing so brings
down the government and forces a new election.
Incumbent politicians look forward to new elections with
about the same enthusiasm that children look forward to
visiting the dentist.93
Little wonder, then, notes Wilson, that “Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan was scarcely exaggerating when he said that the United
States is the only democratic government with a legislative
branch.”94 On this reading, state constitutional reformers only
succeeded in cutting their own ideological throats.
But, although appealing and often true, we should not take this
framework too far. Even assuming that Wilson’s analysis is
correct, it was by no means obvious in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. We may now casually accept as fact the
93 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO
WHY THEY DO IT 237–38 (1989).
94 Id. at 238.
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notion of prime ministerial dominance over the United Kingdom’s
Parliament; at the time, the parliamentary system might have
looked like constant intrigue, particularly if (as many reformers
did) one followed Gladstone. The Grand Old Man had two
governments upended by Parliamentary intrigue, as Joseph
Chamberlain split the Liberal Party over Home Rule in 1885,95 and
nine years later, internal Cabinet politics forced Gladstone into
retirement at age 85.96
Moreover, Wilson’s framework might be questioned for
selective evidence. Perhaps Great Britain has settled into a
comfortable pattern of prime ministerial dominance,97 but that is
far from the case in other parliamentary countries. Israel has long
suffered under unstable coalitions, usually driven by small parties,
which have arguably hamstrung the ability of its prime ministers
in peace negotiations. Constant parliamentary dissolutions became
the hallmark of Weimar Germany (along with elections that
returned parliaments unable to form stable governments).98 Nor
does the British system of individual districts elected through the
‘first-past-the-post’ rule solve the problem: Indian voters have not
returned a majority government in a quarter of a century, and
Indian governance has suffered for years from the intricate and
95 See R.C.K. ENSOR, ENGLAND: 1870–1914, at 97–99 (1936) (explaining that the
First Irish Home Bill resulted in an “alliance” between Irish nationalists and some
liberals, with “dissentient liberals” and conservatives sitting on the other side).
96 See id. at 211, 214–15 (noting that Cabinet’s failure to support Gladstone
after the failure of the Second Irish Home Rule Bill helped to cause his
resignation).
97 Or perhaps not.
As this Article was being prepared, the 2010 British
elections returned a hung Parliament, resulting in an unconventional (and often
ideologically incompatible) coalition between the Conservatives and their junior
partner, the Liberal Democrats. See Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Deal:
Full Text, THE GUARDIAN (May 12, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2010/may/12/lib-dem-tory-deal-coalition (including text from the
agreement that was created to “underpin . . . [the] coalition government” between
the Tories and the Liberal Democrats following the 2010 British elections); Election
2010: First Hung Parliament in UK for Decades, BBC NEWS (May 7, 2010, 11:29 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8667071.stm (reporting that no major political party
succeeded in gaining a majority of the seats in Parliament).
98 See GORDON A. CRAIG, GERMANY: 1866–1945, at 509–10 (1978) (“[B]etween
February 1919 . . . and June 1928 . . . fifteen separate cabinets passed across the
political stage, none performing for longer than eighteen months and several
disappearing into the wings in less than three . . . . More and more, parliamentary
politics came to resemble an endless cabinet crisis, with more time and energy
expended on the task of filling the ministerial chairs than in governing the
country.”).
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fragile coalition deals necessary to form a government. Apparently
legislators in parliamentary system are not as powerless as some
might think.
In any event, the constitutional reformers—who would
eventually become prominent in the Progressive movement—had
their own views on how to combat legislative corruption: a
stronger executive, empowered by a professional civil service,
which could rise above ‘partisanship.’
7. CONCLUSION
So why should anyone care? Is this any more than antiquarian
interest? To answer these questions, we might look at Senate
Republican Leader Mitch McConnell.
McConnell may not go down in history as a Lion of the Senate.
At the start of the 111th Congress, however, he shrewdly assessed
the nature of American public opinion and developed an insideCongress strategy: with only forty-one caucus members,99 he
needed to maintain absolute Republican unity and refuse to
compromise with either Congressional Democrats or the Obama
White House. Such a strategy, he argued to his fellow GOP
Senators, would not only slow down the administration’s program
but also deny it political legitimacy.100 Nowhere was this more
critical than on the administration’s centerpiece legislation, health
care reform:
‘It was absolutely critical that everybody be together
because if the proponents of the bill were able to say it was
bipartisan, it tended to convey to the public that this is
O.K., they must have figured it out,’ Mr. McConnell said
about the health legislation in an interview, suggesting that
even minimal Republican support could sway the public.
‘It’s either bipartisan or it isn’t.’101

99 See Brian Beutler, All 41 Senate Republicans Oppose Financial Reform Bill, Say
Will Lead to ‘Endless Taxpayer Bailouts,’ TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 16, 2010, 6:07
PM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/all-41-senate-republicans-opposefinancial-reform-bill-say-will-lead-to-endless-taxpayer-bailouts (indicating that
there were 41 Republicans in the Senate in 2010).
100 Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney, Senate G.O.P. Leader Finds Weapon in
Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/us/
politics/17mcconnell.html.
101 Id. (emphasis added).
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McConnell realized that for the American voter, calling
something ‘bipartisan’ gives it a seal of approval. ‘Bipartisan’
legislation means good legislation, something that has been
‘figured out,’ as if it is a mathematical puzzle.102 ‘Partisan’
legislation, on the other hand, is bad, reflective of something
extreme or illegitimate. ‘Responsible party government’ in the
American lexicon is something of an oxymoron. That different
people or groups might have genuine and sincere differences over
the proper direction of public policy is something close to heresy.
Such beliefs also account for the hatred of Americans for their
legislatures. Political scientists John Hibbing and Elizabeth TheissMorse used focus groups and voluminous survey data to show
that people do not know much and do not care much about policy.
Instead, they believe in broad goals for the country, and they think
that political actors working in good faith could accomplish those
goals with minimum disagreement if they wanted to. Thus, they
write:
People believe that Americans all have the same basic
goals, and they are consequently turned off by political
debate and deal making that presuppose an absence of
consensus.
People believe these activities would be
unnecessary if decision makers were in tune with the
(consensual) public interest rather than cacophonous
special interests.103

102 Although McConnell is the most prominent practitioner of blocking
bipartisanship, he is not the only one. Indeed, avoiding bipartisanship is a
bipartisan exercise. When, in 2005, President Bush wanted to privatize Social
Security, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi drew a hard, uncompromising line
against Republican proposals. Moving toward compromise, she argued:

would have persuaded people that there must have been something
wrong with Social Security that needed fixing. She suggested that Dems
[sic] should keep that message in mind as they prepare to do battle over
Ryan’s Medicare proposals. ‘We got criticized for it, but it was the most
important thing,’ Pelosi said. ‘We couldn’t have our own proposal on
Social Security because it would confuse the public.’
Greg Sargent, Pelosi: Dems Shouldn’t Take GOP’s Bait on Medicare, WASH. POST (Apr.
6,
2011,
3:39
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/post/pelosi-dems-shouldnt-take-gops-bait-on-medicare/2011/03/0/
AFFRhVqC_blog.html.
103 JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:
AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 7 (2002).
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Such a political ideology makes it quite difficult to adequately
or clearly frame policy choices for voters. Political actors in just
about any democratic system seek to cast blame on their political
opponents, but it reaches a high art in the United States, and it
acquires a surreal tone when each side accuses the other of not
being sufficiently ‘bipartisan.’
The inability to adequately frame choices is not merely a matter
of intellectual pique. As this Article is being written, the United
States is going through a series of fiscal and financial crises all
brought about through dysfunctional governance. As noted in the
Introduction, the federal government shut down for sixteen days in
October 2013 and nearly defaulted because of Republican refusals
to lift the debt ceiling.104 This was a reprise of similar incidents in
2011. Minnesota, faced with the same sort of divided government,
actually did shut down for a few weeks.105 California has also shut
down several times over the past twenty years for the same
reason.106 While the immediate cause of these trends lies in a sharp
ideological divergence between the parties, a gulf precipitated by
the sharp right turn of the Republican Party over the past few
years, its broader cause stems from the inability of the electorate to
make fundamental choices.
Presidentialism at both the state and federal levels allows
voters to do so and perhaps might even encourage them in the
effort. Asking about the absence of parliaments in the states, then,
reveals more fundamental problems in voter behavior. Even if
true, of course, there is little point in cursing the darkness. But
104 See Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, Government Shuts Down in
Budget Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/
01/us/politics/congress-shutdown-debate.html (discussing the causes of the
shutdown); Obama Signs Bill Ending Shutdown, Raising Debt Limit, CHI. TRIB. (Oct.
17, 2013, 12:19 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-governmentshutdown-20131016,0,1118789.story (announcing that the federal government
reopened after President Obama signed “an 11th-hour deal . . . to . . . pull the
world’s biggest economy back from the brink of a historic debt default”).
105 For a general background on the Minnesota government shutdown, see A
Sign of Things to Come? ECONOMIST, Jul. 7, 2011, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/18928883.
106 Strictly speaking, of course, California’s repeated fiscal crises over the last
twenty years have not always been caused by divided government. But because
the state’s constitution until last year required a two-thirds vote to pass a budget,
a provision only true in two other states, and still requires two-thirds to raise
taxes, it effectively creates divided government even within the legislative branch
itself. I am thus on firm ground in including it as an example of the perils of
divided government.
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perhaps forcing democratic choices might make sense: if required
to choose one party or the other, voters would be less inclined to
demonstrate the tendencies that Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
discuss.
If history is any indication, the process of state
constitutional revision will proceed apace in the future: when the
next opportunity arises, state constitution makers should bring a
parliament to the United States.
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